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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate how equities of nine 
individual economic sectors are 
affected when monetary policy 
announcements in the form of federal 
funds rate changes are made over the 
period January 1, 1999 to May 11, 
2005. This sector-analysis is conducted 
over a recent time period, when the 
Federal Open Market Committee has 
adopted a policy of immediate 
disclosure of its federal funds target 
rate changes. Our results indicate that 
the Consumer Discretionary and 
Technology sectors’ equity returns are 
negatively and significantly related to 
changes in the federal funds target 
rate. This negative relationship 
appears to be especially pronounced 
for decreases in the federal funds 
target rate. A positive and significant 
relationship exists between equity 
returns in the Consumer Staples 
Sector and federal funds target rate 
changes, which is again concentrated 
in federal funds target rate decreases. 
A surprising finding is that Utility 
Sector returns tend to decrease in 
response to decreases in the federal 
funds target rate. In summary, we 
find that the relationship between 
equity returns and federal funds 
target rate changes documented in 
previous studies is more pronounced 
for some sectors in the economy.  
 
Federal Funds Target Rate Changes 
and Sector Equity Returns 
 
Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to 
investigate how equities of individual 
sectors are affected when monetary 
policy announcements in the form of 
federal funds rate changes are made over 
the period January 1, 2000 to December 
31, 2004. We contribute to the existing 
literature in two ways. First, we 
investigate the announcement effect to 
federal funds target rate changes for nine 
separate economic sectors. To our 
knowledge, a sector-analysis of 
monetary policy changes has not been 
performed to date. While some studies 
have failed to identify an aggregate 
announcement effect, we believe that the 
announcement effect may be 
concentrated in a few select sectors that 
exhibit a particularly high level of 
interest rate sensitivity.  
Second, this sector-analysis is 
investigated over a recent time period, 
when the Federal Open Market 
Committee has adopted a policy of 
immediate disclosure of its federal funds 
target rate change. Other studies have 
found that this policy, which the FOMC 
adopted in 1994, has concentrated the 
market reaction closer to the time of the 
announcement. Consequently, the effect 
on separate economic sectors should be 
more clearly discernible.  
This study will examine the 
announcement effect of changes in the 
federal funds target rate on specific 
factors during the January 1, 1999 to 
May 11, 2005 period. Specifically, we 
will investigate the equity performance 
  
associated with increases or decreases in 
the federal funds target rate for the 
following economic sectors: 
1) Consumer discretionary 
2) Consumer staples 
3) Energy 
4) Financial 
5) Health care 
6) Industrial 
7) Materials 
8) Technology, and 
9) Utilities 
The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
a review of related literature. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology. The 
results are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
Review of Related Literature 
 
Many previous studies have 
investigated the announcement effect. In 
this section, we will discuss the past 
work by grouping their contributions 
into four major themes. The 
announcement effect and its implications 
on market efficiency will be the first 
topic covered. The second topic will 
look at past studies that have separated 
the announcement effect into expected 
or unexpected announcements. This will 
be followed by looking at the studies 
that have examined different operation 
regimes and how this influences the 
announcement effect. The fourth theme 
will examine past work that has looked 
at the practice of immediate disclosure 
and how this has contributed to the 
announcement effect. 
The relationship between market 
efficiency and the announcement effect 
has been the underlying concern of many 
studies. Particularly, previous studies 
have investigated how an adjustment in 
prices due to “expected” information is 
justified in an efficient market and how 
quickly information should be absorbed 
into equity values. Many attempts, using 
different perspectives, have shown the 
markets to be efficient in dealing with 
the announcement effect.1 
            Waud (1970) was one of the first 
studies done on the announcement 
effect. His work attempted to isolate 
how much of the announcement effect 
was due to economic realities, and how 
much was due the psychological impact 
on the public’s expectations. If interest 
rates are adjusted, then it will have a real 
economic impact in valuating securities, 
since both expected cash flows and the 
discount value could be altered, which in 
turn should impact prices. Once these 
adjustments are accounted for, any 
further move in prices could be 
attributed to some other factor. Waud 
(1970) does find that an announcement 
effect does exist outside of the 
fundamentals. “After removing 
systematic components from such data, 
an analysis of the random component 
strongly suggests that there is an 
announcement effect on expectations 
associated with discount rate changes” 
(Waud [1970]). Waud also finds that 
there is some anticipation of the change 
in the days preceding the announcement. 
Demiralp (2001) focuses on the 
anticipation of change in relation to the 
announcement of the change.  According 
to the author, the increased transparency 
created by the Fed’s 1994 policy of 
immediate public announcements should 
result in a more effective prediction of 
                                                 
1 If market interest rates adjust to target interest 
rate changes by the Federal Reserve, we should 
expect an effect on equities. The positive 
relationship between target interest rates 
(discount rate and federal funds target rate) and 
market interest rates has been documented by 
Cook and Hahn (1988), Cook and Hahn (1989), 
and Thornton (1998), among others. 
  
monetary adjustments by the market.  
This anticipation effect moves interest 
rates prior to the announcement which 
diminishes the effect of the actual 
announcement. This study goes on to 
show that the market only reacts to the 
unexpected portion of any 
announcement.   
As previously mentioned, many 
studies have attempted to distinguish 
between expected and non-expected 
announcements. These studies typically 
justify efficient markets by showing that 
any market reaction is due to some 
unanticipated factor within the 
announcement. This supports market 
efficiency in that prices should only 
move upon new information. We 
contend that there is some information 
even in expected changes. As stated in 
Madura and Schnusenberg (1998) “even 
though financial market participants 
devote much time and resources on Fed 
watching, announcements about changes 
in the Fed’s policy tools still contain 
valuable information.” 
The second issue of market 
efficiency deals with the timing of price 
adjustments. Many studies address this 
issue. Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), 
Chen and Mohan (1998), Prather and 
Bertin (1999), and Lobo (2002) all 
conclude that prices quickly adjust to 
new information contained within the 
Fed’s announcements on monetary 
direction. Most studies done on the 
announcement effect find the markets to 
be efficient in this regard. Prather and 
Bertin (1999) state: “Virtually all studies 
find that such policy changes are quickly 
reflected in stock prices, thus lending 
further support to the proponents of 
market efficiency.” This finding is also 
confirmed by Chen and Mohan (1998), 
who investigate intra-day trading and 
find that the market reacts to unexpected 
announcement.  
            Previous studies also attempt to 
distinguish between expected and 
unexpected announcements. Smirlock 
and Yawitz (1985), for instance, separate 
announced monetary policy into 
technical and non-technical 
announcements. Technical 
announcements are expected or 
anticipated by the market, while non-
technical announcements are a surprise 
to the market and therefore contain new 
information. Consistent with he efficient 
markets hypothesis, the authors argue 
that technical announcements will have 
little or no impact on equities whereas 
non-technical announcements will.   
Similarly, Chen and Mohan 
(1998) find a significant negative stock 
price reaction for non-technical 
announcements, but no significant 
reaction for technical announcements.  
Likewise, Bomfim (2001) uses several 
tests to examine the volatility 
surrounding the day of the 
announcement and the day before the 
scheduled FOMC meeting. Bomfim 
finds significant variations of volatility 
attributable to unexpected 
announcements of monetary policy. 
Specifically, Bomfim's statistical tests 
show a decrease in volatility of -49 
percent of typical levels on pre-
announcement days, regardless of 
whether the announcement was expected 
or not. Conversely, the tests show that 
by isolating surprise announcements on 
announcement day “(it) has the effect of 
nearly doubling the news effect” 
(Bomfim [2001]). When not 
distinguishing between expected and 
unexpected announcements, the authors 
find an increase in volatility of 42 
percent of typical levels on 
announcement days. When Bomfim uses 
  
a model to isolate surprise 
announcements he finds that volatility 
increases 79 percent of typical levels.   
            Much of the work that separates 
expected and surprise announcements 
contend that the market has already built 
expected information into prices.  
Therefore, only new information that 
surprises the market will have an 
announcement effect. If the information 
was expected, under efficient markets, 
there would be no “announcement 
effect”, because no news would be 
presented. 
            We will not attempt to 
distinguish between technical and non-
technical announcements in our 
research. Although we see the merit in 
doing so, much work has already 
covered this issue with similar results.  
We also see the inherent problem in 
making this distinction. The abstract 
nature of exactly how much of the 
announcement was expected, and how 
much was not, is difficult to precisely 
determine.  We feel that looking at the 
announcements without exception will 
render more reliable results. 
Furthermore, even if the market 
correctly predicts a move by the Fed, 
uncertainty would still exist in the 
magnitude of the adjustment. If the 
market could predict the Feds actions 
with certainty, there would never be an 
unexpected announcement. Therefore, 
even with the best estimates, there would 
still be an element of uncertainty in 
markets predictions. The conformation 
of these predictions would reveal new 
market information. 
            Other research focuses on the 
relevant policy tool in relation to market 
reactions. Madura and Schnusenberg 
(1998) take into account the “operation 
regime” when examining the effect 
monetary policy has on interest rates.  
This study breaks down different time 
periods when the Federal Reserve is 
targeting either reserve levels or interest 
rates.  Depending on the method 
incorporated by the Fed, either the 
federal funds target rate or the discount 
rate would be relevant in interpreting the 
monetary stance on announcement day. 
In another study done by Madura and 
Schnusenberg (2000), the effect of 
directional changes in the relevant 
monetary policy tool on banks equities is 
investigated. They find that there is a 
significant reaction when the Fed signals 
the market about the economic outlook 
through the relevant policy tools. 
            Mann and Atra (2001) continue 
the idea of a relevant monetary policy 
tool.  Like previous work, they divide 
periods of time by what the Fed’s target 
is.  As noted in Madura and 
Schnusenberg (1998), if the Fed is 
targeting levels of reserves, then the 
discount rate is the relevant policy tool.  
If the Fed is targeting the level of 
interest rates, then the Fed funds target 
rate is the relevant monetary policy tool. 
            The studies that emphasis 
operating regimes use the relevant policy 
tool when measuring the announcement 
effect. Distinguishing between these 
periods allows one to view the market’s 
reaction in light of the relative 
announcement. If one were to measure 
the announcement effect using the 
discount rate only, they would observe 
little market reaction during periods of 
the Fed targeting interest rates. 
Moreover, the market, being aware of 
the Fed’s target, knows which tools 
imply a shift or continuation of monetary 
policy. This suggests that the relevant 
indicator should be used when observing 
the announcement effect. Mann and Atra 
(2001), for example, find that the 
operating procedure and/or target vehicle 
  
used by the Federal Reserve influences 
the efficacy of the policy 
indicator. There have been studies that 
minimize the importance of separating 
operation regimes. Chen and Mohan 
(1998) find that there is still a negative 
effect of equity returns regardless of the 
operation regime. Chen and Mohan 
conclude that unexpected discount rate 
changes have a significantly negative 
effect on equity returns irrespective of 
Federal Reserve operating procedures.  
            For our study, we will consider 
the relevant indicator in approaching the 
announcement effect. The policy of the 
Fed over our sample period from 1999 to 
2005 is to target interest rates.  
Consequently, we will focus on the 
federal funds target rate. The time span 
that we examine is relatively short. 
There have been many studies that have 
looked at the announcement effect over 
many years. We feel our work will 
contribute to existing studies by focusing 
only on a recent time period. While this 
will limit are samples, we feel the 
relevance of the information will be 
enhanced. Our paper looks at the 
announcement effect over a period of 
roughly six years (1999-2005). Because 
of this small sample we will not study 
events over multiple operation regimes.  
Given this simplicity, we will only focus 
on the federal funds rate, which is the 
appropriate policy tool during our 
sample period. 
            Our entire sample period from 
1999 to 2005 encompasses the time 
when the Fed has used a policy of 
immediate disclosure of FOMC meeting 
results. In February 1994, the Federal 
Reserve Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) changed its operating 
procedures. Previously, monetary 
announcements occurred around 45 days 
after FOMC meeting (Thornton [1996]).  
Now the announcements are made as 
soon as the Fed reaches its decision.  
This change in procedure is relevant to 
the announcement effect, in that it 
eliminated the lag time between the 
FOMC meeting and the announcement.   
            Studies have been done to see if 
this change in policy affected the 
announcement effect. Bomfim (2001) 
focused on market volatility surrounding 
the Fed’s announcement. The study finds 
that volatility is low on the days 
preceding the announcement while it is 
high on the day of the announcement.  
This pre-announcement effect was 
attributed to the change in policy. “In 
particular, such pre-announcement 
effects are present only over the past five 
years or so, a period when the majority 
of policy decisions have actually been 
taken at the FOMC’s regularly 
scheduled meetings”  (Bomfim [2001]). 
            Thornton (1996) finds evidence 
of an announcement effect before the 
Fed adopted a policy of immediate 
disclosure. His work shows that the Fed 
change in policy did not create an 
announcement effect, nor did it increase 
the magnitude of the effect. However, 
Thornton (1996) does show a change in 
the timing of the effect. Particularly, the 
author finds that the announcement 
effect occurs immediately under a policy 
of immediate disclosure. Before the 
change in Fed policy, Thornton (1996) 
shows that the announcement effect did 
exist, but was concentrated over several 
days. The inverse effect on equities is 
also illustrated by Demiralp and Jorda 
(2004), who find that Treasury security 
rates react much more in unison during 
announcement days after the 1994 policy 
change. This more direct adjustment of 
market interest rates should result in 
more concentrated equity adjustments on 
announcement dates. 
  
            The time span of our study will 
be under the policy of immediate 
disclosure of announcements. We feel 
this to be an advantage because it 
captures the announcement effect more 
effectively. We will not examine the 
effect this change in policy had on the 
announcement effect, because it is not 
relevant to our study. This paper will 
only concern itself with the current 
policy at hand. However, we do feel that 
this shift in policy is worth mentioning 
because of its implications on the 
announcement effect. 
Two studies that are most closely 
related to the current paper are Madura 
and Schnusenberg (2000) and Harun, 
Hassan, and Zaher (2005). Both of these 
studies examine the performance of 
equities as a result of changed in Fed 
monetary policy tools. Madura and 
Schnusenberg (2000) find a negative 
relationship between a directional move 
in the Feds relevant policy tool, which is 
either the discount rate or the federal 
funds rate, and bank equity returns.  
Harun, Hassan, and Zaher (2005) 
investigate whether the observed stock 
price reactions of commercial banks to 
monetary policy actions are dependent 
on the stance of monetary policy and the 
state of the economy. The authors find 
that the effect of bank equities, 
particularly the effect on bank holding 
companies, is more pronounced during 
periods of favorable business conditions. 
The present study contributes to these 
papers by investigate additional 
economic sectors.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
We investigate the stock market 
reaction of the overall market and nine 
economic sectors to announcements of 
federal funds target rate changes by the 
Federal Reserve during the January 1, 
1999 to May 11, 2005 period. Data for 
Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) meetings and federal funds 
target rate changes were obtained from 
the Federal Reserve.  
Over the sample period, the 
Federal Open Market Committee met 54 
times. During the 54 meetings, the 
federal funds target rate was changes 27 
times. Specifically, the FOMC increased 
the federal funds target rate fourteen 
times and decreased the federal funds 
target rate thirteen times. Table 1 
provides a distribution of the federal 
funds target rate changes. 
 
Year Increase Decrease Unchanged Total 
1999 3 0 5 8 
2000 3 0 5 8 
2001 0 11 0 11 
2002 0 1 7 8 
2003 0 1 7 8 
2004 5 0 3 8 
2005 3 0 0 3 
Total 14 13 27 54 
Table 1. Distribution of Federal Funds Target Rate Changes Over the Period January 1, 1999 to May 
11, 2005. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the year 
with the most changes in the federal 
funds target rate is 2001, when the Fed 
decreased the target rate eleven times. 
The most increases occurred in 2004, 
  
when the Fed increased the federal funds 
target rate five times.  
To investigate the effect of the 
overall market and the nine economic 
sectors mentioned previously, we utilize 
exchange-traded funds in the form of 
Select Sector SPDRs. All of these 
SPDRs have stock price information 
available over the entire sample period.  
 
Table 2 presents the daily and 
annualized returns and standard 
deviations for the SPDR and for Select 
Sector SPDRs. The first number in each 
column for the return and standard 
deviation represents the average daily 
percentage over the sample period. The 
second number for the return and 
standard deviation represents the 
annualized percentage over the sample 
period. 
 
 SPY XLY XLP XLE XLF XLV XLI XLB XLK XLU 
Average           
Daily 0.010% 0.026% 0.002% 0.053% 0.035% 0.023% 0.026% 0.035% -0.008% 0.021% 
Annualized 3.723% 10.072% 0.631% 21.309% 13.558% 8.851% 9.904% 13.503% -2.701% 7.842% 
Std. Dev.           
Daily 1.256% 1.552% 1.148% 1.509% 1.818% 1.333% 1.365% 1.547% 2.195% 1.323% 
Annualized 24.001% 29.647% 21.937% 28.835% 34.728% 25.457% 26.079% 29.567% 41.943% 25.269% 
Table 2. Daily and Annualized Returns and Standard Deviations for Nine Economic Sectors  
over the Sample Period from January 1, 1999 to May 11, 2005.  
 
Notes to Table 2: 
SPY = SPDR 
XLY  = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Discretionary 
XLP = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Staples 
XLE = Select Sector SPDR – Energy 
XLF = Select Sector SPDR – Financial 
XLV = Select Sector SPDR – Health Care 
XLI = Select Sector SPDR – Industrial 
XLB = Select Sector SPDR – Materials 
XLK = Select Sector SPDR – Technology 
XLU = Select Sector SPDR - Utilities 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the 
Select Sector SPDR – Energy (XLE) has 
the highest annualized return over the 
sample period of 21.31%. The Select 
Sector SPDR – Technology (XLK) has 
the lowest annualized return (and the 
only negative return) over the sample 
period of -2.70%. Given the nature of 
the recession during the sample period, 
this observation is not surprising. The 
sectors with the highest annualized 
standard deviations are the Financial  
 
 
Sector and the Technology Sector with 
annualized standard deviations of 
34.73% and 41.94%, respectively.  
Table 3 shows the correlation 
matrix across the exchange-traded funds 
utilized in the sample. The correlation 
coefficients between the Select Sector 
SPDRs and the S&P 500 SPDR (SPY) 
range from 0.418 (for the Energy SPDR) 
to 0.825 (for the Technology SPDR). In 
general, the correlation coefficients 
between the Select Sector SPDRs are 
low, ranging from 0.213 (between the 
  
Consumer Staples SPDR and the 
Technology SPDR) to 0.730 (between 
the Consumer Discretionary SPDR and 
the Industrial SPDR). The low 
correlation coefficients indicate that the 
separate economic sectors may be 
affected differently by changes in the 
federal funds target rate. 
 
 SPY XLY XLP XLE XLF XLV XLI XLB XLK XLU 
SPY 1.000 0.757 0.521 0.418 0.725 0.729 0.817 0.570 0.825 0.498 
XLY  1.000 0.460 0.315 0.645 0.636 0.730 0.585 0.575 0.372 
XLP   1.000 0.315 0.465 0.396 0.461 0.399 0.213 0.381 
XLE    1.000 0.328 0.318 0.420 0.432 0.220 0.385 
XLF     1.000 0.581 0.660 0.526 0.503 0.429 
XLV      1.000 0.666 0.471 0.599 0.378 
XLI       1.000 0.684 0.654 0.438 
XLB        1.000 0.376 0.364 
XLK         1.000 0.301 
XLU          1.000 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix Between Returns on the SPDR ETF and Nine  
Select Sector SPDRs Over the Sample Period from January 1, 1999 to May 11, 2005.  
 
Notes to Table 3: 
SPY = SPDR 
XLY  = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Discretionary 
XLP = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Staples 
XLE = Select Sector SPDR – Energy 
XLF = Select Sector SPDR – Financial 
XLV = Select Sector SPDR – Health Care 
XLI = Select Sector SPDR – Industrial 
XLB = Select Sector SPDR – Materials 
XLK = Select Sector SPDR – Technology 
XLU = Select Sector SPDR - Utilities 
 
To isolate the effect of 
announcements of changes in the federal 
funds target rate, we utilize a 
methodology similar to Thorbecke 
(1997) and Madura and Schnusenberg 
(2000). Specifically, we utilize the 
following model to investigate the effect 
of federal funds target rate changes on 
each of the nine sectors: 
 
ttmtSECTORt FFTRR εααα +Δ++= 210 ,   (1) 
where 
SECTORtR  = the Select Sector SPDR return for the sector under investigation on  
day t; 
mtR   = the return on the SPDR ETF on day t; and  
tFFTΔ   = the amount by which the Fed changed the target federal funds rate  
on day t, orthogonalized with respect to the SPDR ETF.  
 
In equation (1), the federal funds rate 
variable is equal to zero on any day in 
which it was not changed by the Fed. 
However, because a change in the target 
rate can affect the entire market, a 
sector’s returns could be affected 
indirectly through its effect on the 
market. Consequently, we orthogonalize 
the model to capture the sensitivity of 
sector equity returns to the change in the 
federal funds rate target beyond the 
indirect sensitivity that could occur 
through the market. To accomplish this, 
we regess the federal funds target rate 
change on the return on the SPDR ETF 
returns and use the resulting residual as 
the federal funds target rate variable in 
equation (1).  
 Also notice in equation (1) that 
we utilize the SPDR exchange-traded 
fund as a proxy for the market. Since we 
utilize Select Sector SPDRs to measure 
the impact of federal funds target rate 
changes on economic sectors, using the 
SPDR as a proxy for the market ensures 
consistency. Moreover, by using 
exchange-traded funds throughout our 
analysis, we utilize tradable proxies for 
the market. Equation (1) is estimated 
nine times, once for each of the nine 
economic sectors.  
To investigate whether there is a 
differential impact on sector equity 
returns depending on whether the federal 
funds target rate was increased or 
decreased, we utilize the following 
additional models: 
 
ttmtSECTORt PFFTRR εβββ +Δ++= 210    (2) 
ttmtSECTORt NFFTRR εθθθ +Δ++= 210 ,   (3) 
where 
tPFFTΔ  = the amount by which the Fed increased the federal funds target rate  
on day t; and 
tNFFTΔ  = the amount by which the Fed decreased the federal funds target  
rate on day t.  
 
Equations (2) and (3) are each estimated nine times, once for each economic sector. 
 
Results 
 
Table 4 displays the regression 
results from estimating equation (1). The 
expected coefficient 1α  is positive, as all 
sectors we investigate are positively 
correlated with the market. The expected 
coefficient 2α is negative; an increase 
(decrease) in the federal funds target rate 
is expected to have an unfavorable (a 
favorable) impact on a given sector’s 
equity returns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As expected, the coefficient 1α  
for the market return ( mtR ) is highly 
positive and significant for every sector. 
This indicates that the market returns 
and sector returns are highly correlated. 
This positive relationship is most 
pronounced for the Industrial Sector 
(XLI) and the Technology Sector 
(XLK), with coefficients of 0.89 and 
1.44, respectively, indicating that, on 
average, a one percent increase 
(decrease) in the S&P 500 SPDR (SPY) 
leads to an increase (decrease) of 0.89% 
  
and 1.44% in the industrial and 
technology sectors, respectively. This 
positive relationship is also confirmed 
by the very high adjusted 2R  figures of 
66.76% and 68.02% for the two sectors, 
respectively.  
As might be expected, the two 
sectors that are least correlated with the 
market are the Energy and Utility 
sectors, with 1α  coefficients of 0.50 and 
0.53 and adjusted 2R  values of 17.44% 
and 24.79%, respectively. 
 
 Intercept 
mtR  FFTΔ  Adj. 2R  F-value 
XLY 0.000 
(0.67) 
0.935 
(46.34)*** 
-1.169 
(-2.18)** 
57.38% 1,076.12*** 
XLP -0.000 
(-0.12) 
0.476 
(24.44)*** 
1.73 
(3.34)*** 
27.53% 304.31*** 
XLE 0.000 
(1.40) 
0.503 
(18.40)*** 
0.584 
(0.80) 
17.44% 169.68*** 
XLF 0.000 
(0.78) 
1.049 
(42.06)*** 
-0.15 
(-0.23) 
52.53% 884.76*** 
XLV 0.000 
(0.68) 
0.774 
(42.58)*** 
-0.399 
(-0.83) 
53.16% 907.06*** 
XLI 0.000 
(0.86) 
0.888 
(56.64)*** 
0.274 
(0.66) 
66.76% 1,604.61*** 
XLB 0.000 
(0.87) 
0.702 
(27.71)*** 
-0.646 
(-0.96) 
32.44% 384.37*** 
XLK -0.000 
(-0.71) 
1.441 
(58.27)*** 
-1.187 
(-1.80)* 
68.02% 1,699.34*** 
XLU 0.000 
(0.54) 
0.525 
(22.97)*** 
0.624 
(1.03) 
24.79% 264.24*** 
Table 4. Sensitivity of Sector Returns to Federal Funds Rate  
Target Changes Over the Sample Period  
from January 1, 1999 to May 11, 2005.  
(t-statistic in parentheses). 
 
Notes to Table 4: 
*  Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
SPY = SPDR 
XLY  = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Discretionary 
XLP = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Staples 
XLE = Select Sector SPDR – Energy 
XLF = Select Sector SPDR – Financial 
XLV = Select Sector SPDR – Health Care 
XLI = Select Sector SPDR – Industrial 
XLB = Select Sector SPDR – Materials 
XLK = Select Sector SPDR – Technology 
XLU = Select Sector SPDR - Utilities 
 
 
Table 4 also shows the results from 
estimating the coefficient 2α , which 
indicates the sensitivity of sector returns 
to changes in the federal funds target 
rate. The coefficient has the expected 
negative sign and is significant for only 
two of the nine sectors; the Consumer 
Discretionary Sector has a coefficient of 
-1.17, and the Technology Sector has a 
coefficient of -1.19. This indicates that, 
  
on average, the sector returns decrease 
(increase) by 1.17% and 1.19% for a one 
percent increase (decrease) in the federal 
funds target rate for the Consumer 
Discretionary and Technology Sector, 
respectively.  
A surprising result in Table 4 is 
the positive sign and high significance of 
the 2α  coefficient for the Consumer 
Staples Sector. On average, a one 
percent increase (decrease) in the federal 
funds target rate leads to a 1.73% 
increase (decrease) in the Consumer 
Staples Sector. While it may be argued 
that Consumer Staples, such as food and 
clothing, are insensitive to changes in 
interest rates, this result is somewhat 
surprising. It could be, however, that 
consumers increase their purchases of 
staple products when the Fed decides to 
increase interest rates in order to avoid 
higher finance charges if consumers are 
indebted. Likewise, consumer staples 
firms may be less affected by increases 
in interest rates if they have long-term 
borrowing arrangements with their banks 
or have issued long-term bonds.  
The implication that the return to 
the Consumer Staples Sector decreases 
when the Fed decreases the federal funds 
target rate can be explained similarly. If 
consumer staples firms are locked into 
long-term borrowing arrangements, then 
they are unable to benefit from 
decreasing interest rates as market 
interest rates decline. From a consumer 
perspective, it could be argued that 
consumers delay their purchases of 
certain consumer staples products when 
the Fed lowers interest rates to wait until 
that change manifests itself in other 
interest rates, such as credit cards. 
To further investigate whether 
the sensitivity of sector returns is due to 
increases or decreases in the federal 
funds target rate, equations (2) and (3) 
are estimated separately in Tables 5 and 
6. Table 5 investigates the sensitivity of 
sector returns to federal funds target rate 
increases, while Table 6 investigates the 
sensitivity of sector returns to federal 
funds target rate decreases. The expected 
coefficients 2β  and 2θ  in equations (2) 
and (3), respectively, are negative. 
 
 Intercept 
mtR  PFFTΔ  Adj. 2R  F-value 
XLY 0.000 
(0.71) 
0.936 
(46.25)*** 
-0.446 
(-0.45) 
57.26% 1,070.80*** 
XLP -0.000 
(-0.20) 
0.475 
(24.30)*** 
0.808 
(0.84) 
27.05% 297.11*** 
XLE 0.000 
(1.40) 
0.503 
(18.39)*** 
-0.159 
(-0.12) 
17.41% 169.30*** 
XLF 0.000 
(0.81) 
1.050 
(42.04)*** 
-0.480 
(-0.39) 
52.54% 884.86*** 
XLV 0.000 
(0.61) 
0.773 
(42.51)*** 
0.695 
(0.78) 
53.15% 906.98*** 
XLI 0.000 
(0.81) 
0.888 
(56.56)*** 
0.376 
(0.49) 
66.75% 1,604.33*** 
XLB 0.000 
(0.93) 
0.703 
(27.71)*** 
-0.813 
(-0.66) 
32.42% 384.01*** 
XLK -0.000 
(-0.77) 
1.440 
(58.13)*** 
0.833 
(0.69) 
67.96% 1,694.99*** 
XLU 0.000 
(0.64) 
0.526 
(2.30)*** 
-1.315 
(-1.17) 
24.81% 264.46*** 
Table 5. Sensitivity of Sector Returns to Federal Funds Rate  
Target Increases Over the Sample Period  
from January 1, 1999 to May 11, 2005. 
(t-statistic in parentheses) 
  
Notes to Table 5: 
*  Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
SPY = SPDR 
XLY  = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Discretionary 
XLP = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Staples 
XLE = Select Sector SPDR – Energy 
XLF = Select Sector SPDR – Financial 
XLV = Select Sector SPDR – Health Care 
XLI = Select Sector SPDR – Industrial 
XLB = Select Sector SPDR – Materials 
XLK = Select Sector SPDR – Technology 
XLU = Select Sector SPDR - Utilities 
 
The coefficient 1β  in Table 5, 
which tests the relationship between the 
sector return and the market return, is 
once again most pronounced for the 
Industrial and Technology Sectors, with 
coefficients of 0.89 and 1.44 and 
adjusted 2R  values of 66.75% and 
67.96%, respectively. The relationship is 
again weakest for the Energy and Utility 
Sectors, with 1β  coefficients of 0.50 and 
0.53 and adjusted 2R  values of 17.41% 
and 24.81%, respectively. 
As shown in Table 5, the 2β  
coefficient, which tests the sensitivity of 
sector returns to increases in the federal 
funds target rate, is insignificant for all 
nine sectors. Consequently, an increase 
in the federal funds target rate, on 
average, has no significant impact on 
any one particular sector. 
Table 6 presents the result from 
investigating the sensitivity of sector 
returns to decreases in the federal funds 
target rate. As in Tables 4 and 5, the 
Industrial and Technology sectors are 
most sensitive to market movements as 
measured by the S&P 500 SPDR; the 
Energy and Utility sectors are least 
sensitive to market movements. 
 
 Intercept 
mtR  NFFTΔ  Adj. 2R  
F-value 
XLY 0.000 
(0.46) 
0.934 
(46.29)*** 
-1.490 
(-2.32)** 
57.40% 1,076.85*** 
XLP 0.000 
(0.18) 
0.478 
(24.51)*** 
2.147 
(3.46)*** 
27.56% 304.83*** 
XLE 0.000 
(1.48) 
0.503 
(18.42)*** 
0.906 
(1.04) 
17.46% 169.95*** 
XLF 0.000 
(0.77) 
1.049 
(42.05)*** 
-0.024 
(-0.03) 
52.53% 884.70*** 
XLV 0.000 
(0.55) 
0.773 
(42.56)*** 
-0.868 
(-1.50) 
53.20% 908.73*** 
XLI 0.000 
(0.90) 
0.888 
(56.64)*** 
0.234 
(0.47) 
66.75% 1,604.29*** 
XLB 0.000 
(0.80) 
0.702 
(27.69)*** 
-0.582 
(-0.72) 
32.42% 384.08*** 
XLK -0.000 
(-0.93) 
1.440 
(58.27)*** 
-2.057 
(-2.61)*** 
68.09% 1,704.91*** 
XLU 0.000 
(0.71) 
0.526 
(23.02)*** 
1.454 
(2.00)** 
24.93% 266.19*** 
  
Table 6. Sensitivity of Sector Returns to Federal Funds Rate  
Target Decreases Over the Sample Period 
 from January 1, 1999 to May 11, 2005.  
(t-statistic in parentheses) 
 
Notes to Table 6: 
*  Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
SPY = SPDR 
XLY  = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Discretionary 
XLP = Select Sector SPDR – Consumer Staples 
XLE = Select Sector SPDR – Energy 
XLF = Select Sector SPDR – Financial 
XLV = Select Sector SPDR – Health Care 
XLI = Select Sector SPDR – Industrial 
XLB = Select Sector SPDR – Materials 
XLK = Select Sector SPDR – Technology 
XLU = Select Sector SPDR - Utilities 
 
As shown in Table 6, the 
coefficient 2θ , which measures the 
sensitivity of sector returns to increases 
in the federal funds target rate, has the 
expected negative and significant 
coefficient for the Consumer 
Discretionary and Technology sectors. 
This finding indicates that the negative 
relationship between federal funds target 
rate changes and these sectors’ return is 
primarily driven by federal funds target 
rate decreases. For the Consumer 
Discretionary Sector, this implies that 
consumers are more willing to borrow 
when interest rates are lower to make 
discretionary purchases. 
Technologically-oriented companies are 
frequently highly indebted; the finding 
reported in Table 6 indicates that these 
companies’ valuations increase as their 
cost of capital is reduced. 
Table 6 also shows that the 
positive and significant relationship 
between federal funds target rate 
changes and Consumer Staples Sector 
returns is primarily driven by federal 
funds target rate decreases. Two possible 
explanations for this finding are that 
consumer staples firms are locked into 
long-term borrowing arrangements and 
are consequently unable to benefit from 
decreasing interest rates as market 
interest rates decline. Alternatively, it 
could be argued that consumers delay 
their purchases of certain consumer 
staples products when the Fed lowers 
interest rates to wait until that other 
interest rates (such as credit card rates) 
change in response. 
Interestingly, the coefficient 2θ  
in Table 6 is also positive and significant 
for the Utility Sector, even though there 
was no relationship between federal 
funds target rate changes and this 
sector’s returns in Table 4. On average, 
Utility Sector returns decrease by 1.45% 
for every one percent decrease in the 
federal funds target rate. This result is 
surprising, since utility stocks are a 
natural beneficiary of falling interest 
rates, primarily because of the sector’s 
capital intensity. Since utilities typically 
have very large fixed capital investment 
in their businesses, any change in 
borrowing costs has a much larger 
impact on their overall cost structure, 
  
and hence profitability, than less capital-
intensive stocks. Moreover, the Utility 
Sector pays very high dividends; 
historically, high-paying dividend stocks 
have outperformed lower-paying or no-
dividend-paying stocks by a wide 
margin in falling rate environments.  
One possible explanation for the 
positive relationship between Utility 
Sector returns and federal funds target 
rate changes documented in Table 6 is 
that utilities tend to have a lot of long-
term debt on their balance sheets. Since 
eleven of the thirteen rate decrease 
occurred in 2001, and since four of those 
eleven decreases in the target rate 
occurred after September 11, 2001, 
utilities may have locked into new long-
term debt rates too soon and were unable 
to take advantage of the lower rats that 
prevailed at the end of 2001. This is one 
possible explanation; we leave a full 
investigation of this issue to future 
research. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper is to 
investigate how equities of nine 
individual economic sectors are affected 
when monetary policy announcements in 
the form of federal funds target rate 
changes are made over the period 
January 1, 1999 to May 11, 2005. To our 
knowledge, a sector-analysis of 
monetary policy changes has not been 
performed in the existing literature. This 
sector-analysis is conducted over a 
recent time period, when the Federal 
Open Market Committee has adopted a 
policy of immediate disclosure of its 
federal funds target rate change, which 
should concentrate the market reaction 
closer to the time of the announcement.  
When all changes in the federal 
funds target rate are considered, our 
results indicate that the Consumer 
Discretionary and Technology sectors’ 
equity returns are negatively and 
significantly related to changes in the 
federal funds target rate. This negative 
relationship appears to be especially 
pronounced for decreases in the federal 
funds target rate, perhaps indicating that 
consumers spend more on discretionary 
items in a low interest rate environment, 
while technology companies’ cost of 
capital is reduced. 
An overall positive and 
significant relationship exists between 
equity returns in the Consumer Staples 
Sector and federal funds target rate 
changes, which is again concentrated in 
federal funds target rate decreases. This 
indicates that consumers may wait to 
purchase staple items until other interest 
rates in the economy, such as credit card 
rates, have decreased, or that the balance 
sheet composition of consumer staple 
companies may prevent them from 
taking advantage of the lower interest 
rates in the economy. 
The most surprising finding of 
the present study is that Utility Sector 
returns tend to decrease in response to 
decreases in the federal funds target rate. 
However, one possible explanation for 
this finding is that utility firms were 
unable to take advantage of the lower 
interest rates that resulted from the Fed’s 
actions after September 11, 2001 and 
that they had already locked into new 
long-term debt arrangements.  
Overall, our results indicate that 
the relationship between equity returns 
and federal funds target rate changes 
documented in previous studies is more 
pronounced for some sectors in the 
economy, a finding we believe could 
drive the direction for future research 
that investigates the relationship between 
monetary policy and equity returns. 
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